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ABSTRACT
Technology transfer and acquisition have become hotly debated and controversial
policy issues. Examination of U. S. policy toward transfer of naval technology to Brazil
raises questions of American national security and the validity of the Brazilian requests.
Research reveals a history of dependence on the U. S. Navy and that the Brazilian naval
industry also lags behind its military counterparts in domestic production, purchasing most
naval equipment from abroad.
This paper examines the dependence of the Brazilian Navy on foreign navies and
investigates the naval industry production problems. The U. S./Brazilian relationship
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why is naval technology transfer, arms trade, and the Brazilian connection of
interest to the U. S.? Why are the strengths and capabilities of the Brazilian Navy
important to the U. S. Navy? How important are the technology transfers between
the two navies and why should these transfers be encouraged?
The Brazilian Navy and the U. S. Navy have enjoyed a long and mutually
beneficial association. The support the Brazilian Navy provided in World Wars I
and II was vital to the U. S. war efforts. The close alliance continued after the war.
Officer exchanges, joint education and the naval training and exercises fostered
familiarity and respect.
The U. S. Maritime Strategy now leads the U. S. to once again rediscover the
neglected potential of the Brazilian Navy. Including the South Atlantic in the
Maritime Strategy and realizing that Brazil is the premier naval power in the area,
emphasizes the importance of a strong and capable Brazilian Navy.
The capabilities of the Brazilian Navy must then be a major concern. Since
World War II Brazil has relied primarily on the U. S. for naval equipment and
training. Changing political circumstances caused the U. S. to withdraw naval
support. Brazil suffered neglect and has been forced to make do with an aging
fleet. Only recently, because Brazil turned to Europe for naval technology, has the
Brazilian Navy begun to modernize.
The U. S. must now reexamine its priorities and policies towards Brazil. The
naval technology and training enabling the navy to accomplish projected missions
must be made available if Brazil is to be included in a South Atlantic Maritime
Strategy. The U. S. should reconsider naval technology transfer decisions which

have denied Brazil the naval equipment it desires. As U. S. naval strategy expands
south, U. S. perceptions must not be blinded by technological irresolution.
A. BACKGROUND
During the last four decades modern technology has become one of the
primary sources of national power, prosperity, and strategy. Technology's
impact on international relations has in fact been paradoxical: it has at once
fostered interdependence and cooperation and sharply divided nations by
heightening national competition and enabling greater global projection of
power. [Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1983, p. 1]
The most tyrannical kind of dependence is military technological
dependence. IRonfeldt and Sereseres, 1979, p. 1351
In the world arms trade, there is a growing emphasis on technology
acquisition in place of the purchase of completed weapons systems... In
reality, as more technology has been transferred to nations that previously
purchased all their arms, they have become supplying nations. [Louscher and
Salomone, 1987a, pp. 101, 105]
The surprising increase in the past decade of arms exports from Third World
Countries has generated much discussion and alarm. The primary concern at first
was the possibility that such a rise of arms merchants would be destabilizing and
cause an increase in conflicts as the availability of weapons increased and the
competition caused prices to drop.
A secondary concern was the economic changes caused by the development of
this indigenous production capability. As lesser developed countries began to
mature and cultivate their indigenous industries, they discovered that imported
civilian technology was not only useful but enhanced military industrial capabilities
as well. Thus the industrialized countries became aware that any type of technology
transfer could potentially be useful in strengthening a recipient country's military
establishment. Technology transfer became a hotly debated event and transfer of
military equipment or capability became even more controversial.

The case of Brazil as an arms supplier poses interesting questions. Brazil has
often been cited as one of the most successful arms suppliers to bring its wares to
the market. Brazil can boast of 25 clients, more than any other Third World arms
supplier and has the added advantage of having had some of its weapons designs
thoroughly tested on the battlefield. Brazil is one of the ten largest exporters of
major weapons systems in the world. [Brzoska and Ohlson, 1987, p. 1 12-115]
In examining the Brazilian naval industry, it can be immediately assumed that
it is quite active and as successful as its military counterparts, the Army and the Air
Force. Braz il has the second largest ship-building industry in the world, after
Japan, and has had a very long and close relationship with the United States Navy.
The first U. S. Naval mission established was in Brazil in 1922. Since that time
Brazil has received significant amounts of U. S. naval equipment, training, and
postgraduate and senior service college education in the United States. Brazil also
maintains the most active bilateral naval exercise posture of all Latin American
navies, and engages in an active and dynamic bilateral maritime strategy dialogue
with its American counterpart.
However, closer examination reveals that the Brazilian Navy lags behind its
military counterparts in domestic arms production, produces little indigenously,
and purchases most of its equipment from abroad. It is this anomaly which this
paper will examine.
B. ISSUES
Should U. S. policy towards transfer of naval technology to Brazil be revised,
and if so, in what manner?
To answer this question several issues need to be addressed.

• What is the dependence of the Brazilian Navy on the American Navy and lias
this dependence increased or decreased over time? What effect has this
dependence had on the Brazilian naval industry?
• How did the Brazilian defense industry begin and what were the rationales
used by the Brazilian government to promote domestic military industrial
growth and expansion?
• How has Brazil's technology transfer and acquisition process affected its
relationshiop with the U. S.?
• What are U. S. interests towards Brazil as a naval power and how can America
promote these interests?
These issues are best seen in an historical context. Chapter One surveys the
naval history of Brazil. Particular attention is given to Brazil's relationship with
the U. S. Navy.
Chapter Two assesses the evolution of the Brazilian defense industry. The
technology transfer and acquisition plans employed by the government are
appraised and the role of the navy in the government is examined.
Chapter Three researches the U. S./Brazilian relationship over the last ten to 15
years, investigating the principle events that have affected naval affiliation.
The conclusion offers alternatives to present American policies, in hopes of
effecting positive changes in U. S./Brazilian naval affairs.
C. SOURCES.
Data used in this paper comes from several sources. Dollar value data on arms
transfers was obtained from the following sources: World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers (WMEAT); Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute's (SIPRI) Yearbook', and the U. S. Government's publication on Foreign
Military Sales Agreements. Weapons production capability was obtained from
Jane's Fighting Ships. The updated information on Brazilian naval imports, exports

exports and weapons agreements was obtained from SIPRI Yearbooks 1983
through 1987.
Though these sources are widely used and considered valid, it is necessary to
note that the measurement of technology transfer is difficult at best. Most countries
do not publish the details of their military agreements. As Louscher and Salomone
indicate,
License and coproduction agreements can vary from simple assembly to
joint ventures to factory and system blueprints. The exact nature of each
agreement is generally proprietary and not open to public scrutiny.
Therefore some of the agreements lumped here under the rubric of licenses
may transfer more or less technology than is implied More specific
information cannot be known, but all such agreements here indicate a transfer
of more information than the sale of a completed system and more technical
information than was previously possessed by the recipient. Any license or
coproduction agreement no doubt transfers some knowledge. [Louscher and
Salomone, 1987a, p. Ill]
Though contracts or orders may be announced, the specific agreements which
allow for the technology transfer to take place, such as technician-to-technician
training, license purchase, or sale of designs, are nearly impossible to quantify.
Therefore some of the transfers must be deduced without the benefit of a direct
connection between an agreement and the transfer. These assumptions can be
approximately measured in the quality and success of the final product exported.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several sources have addressed the issue of technology transfer and security
assistance. Louscher and Salomone [1987b] associated U. S. security assistance
policies with the transfer of military technology used to enhance the military
industries of Third World Countries. They indicated that this type of transfer is
vital to lesser developed countries and played an important role in building the

indigenous military industrial base. Neuman (1986, p. 126] also examined the
relationship but determined that such transfers are inconsequential because the
superpowers have retained control over the quality of technological sophistication
of the transfers. However, trade between the second-tier suppliers, such as Brazil
and China, is transferring militarily significant technology that may increase the
level of sophistication in certain areas for both countries.
Moodie [Neuman and Harkavy, eds., 1979] outlined the stages developing
countries usually go through in developing indigenous defense industries. Graham
[Louscher and Salomone, eds., 1987a, pp. 218-222] discussed the mechanism for
commercial technology transfer.
Gray [1982] told a fascinating history of U. S. Navy involvement with Brazil,
and Ferreira [1983] gave the history of the Brazilian Navy from the Brazilian point
of view.
An excellent discussion of arms and technology transfer policies can be found
in Balancing the National Interest. [National Academy of Sciences, 1987] A
detailed examination of Brazil's industrial development is in Gwynnes's [1987]
book.
For additional information on the Brazilian as well as other Latin American
Navies, Schema's [1987] Latin America provides a detailed history. Faltas' [1987]
study of European navies supplied background for understanding the European
naval market. A more in depth look at U. S. decisionmaking for arms sales is in
The Reluctant Supplier [Hammond and others, 1983]

II. THE NAVY OF BRAZIL
A. INTRODUCTION
Brazil's naval history chronicles the long dependence the Brazilian Navy has
had on foreign navies, particularly the American Navy. U. S. conduct and naval
policies in the Latin American region encouraged Brazil's reliance. Transfer of
naval ships and systems from the U. S. to Brazil necessitated transfer of training,
operational skills, tactics, and even the transfer of naval missions. Ultimately,
changes in American policies created an unacceptable level of dependence and
Brazil found itself unable to procure naval equipment. Finally, to sustain the navy,
Brazil was forced to consider alternative sources of assistance. European shipyards
found a willing client and avidly filled the naval gap left by the U. S.
B. BRAZIL'S NAVAL HISTORY
The Brazilian Navy has a long and interesting record. Actual shipbuilding
started in the 18 th century. The most important shipyards were built in Rio de
Janeiro, Salvador and Belem do Para. The facility in Rio began operations in 1763
and is the largest naval shipbuilder in the country today. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 4]
In 1822 the Brazilian fleet was in poor condition. The ships were in bad shape
and were ill armed. They were also poorly commanded and manned due to the
inexperience and lack of resolve of the officers and crews. To remedy this
situation, Brazil hired foreign officers and sailors to help reorganize the navy. The
British were asked to help revamp the fleet and Admiral Lord Cochane soon had
the fleet conducting successful operations along the Brazilian coast. [Ferreira,
1983, p. 6]

In a conflict with Paraguay that lasted from 1865 to 1870, the Brazilian Navy
took part in one of the the most important and most difficult engagements faced by
the Brazilian Armed Forces in the 19th century. The navy struggled for control of
the Paraguay and Parana Rivers, and encountered several problems. First, the
seamen had little experience in riverine warfare. Second, there were no ships in
the navy suitable for river operations. Finally, the Paraguayan Navy had assembled
a strong river fleet and fortified strongholds along the river. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 7]
Brazil thus found it necessary to build, equip, and train an almost new fleet and
provide logistic support for ships operating about 2000 miles from the home port
in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil placed orders to shipbuilders from France and Great
Britain, but also built warships in its own shipyards. By the end of this war the
Brazilian Navy, as one author noted, ranked among the most powerful in the world.
[Ferreira, 1983, p. 7-8]
After 1870 however, the Brazilian_Navy decHnedjn power for several reasons.
There were no external conflicts and all border disputes were resolved through
diplomacy. The Brazilian economy remained primarily based on agricultural
production and little emphasis was given to industrialization. The technological
based gained by the war effort was lost and the Brazilian Armed Forces chose to
import almost all their hardware. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 7]
C. REGIONAL AND OUTSIDE INFLUENCES ON THE BRAZILIAN
NAVY
By the turn of the century, Argentina was becoming a rich and powerfuj
nation^ Brazil and Argentina became involved in an arms race and both navies
placed major orders with European shipyards. Between 1908 and 1910 the
Brazilian Navy acquired two battleships, two cruisers, six destroyers, and one

support ship from England. Italy supplied three coastal submarines and a mother
ship by 1914. With this new fleet, tactics, logistics, and technical skills were all
improved. But the country still lacked an industrial base and dependence on
foreign support was almost absolute. IFerreira, 1983, p. 9]
During World War I, the Brazilian ships joined with the allied nations against
the Central Powers. The Navy still experienced trouble because it had very little
home port support. The navy continued to try to become more self-sufficient but
did not build a single warship in the country during the next two decades. [Ferreira,
1983, p. 91
As the British Navy declined at sea, so did their influence on the Brazilian
Navy. The United States Navy replaced the British Navy as Brazil's mentor. The
establishment of the U. S. Naval Mission in Brazil in 1922 increased U. S.
presence. The stated purpose of this mission was to
cooperate with the Minister of the Navy and with the officers of the Navy in
whatever may be necessary to secure a good organization of the Navy ashore and
afloat; in improving the methods of work in the shops, the shore establishment
and on board ships; in training and instructing the personnel; and in drawing up
and executing plans for the improvement of the Navy for fleet exercises and
naval operations. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 10]
At the beginning of World War II, Brazil had a modernization program
underway, building three destroyers of U. S. design in Rio and placing orders with
Great Britain for six more destroyers. When England could not deliver the
destroyers because of the war, the decision was made to build the ships in Brazil,
using British hull plans, but installing American equipment. Thus the Brazilian
Navy became almost exclusively dependent on the U. S. for the next 25 years.
[Ferreira, 1983, p. 10]
<

In 1 (M2, the Brazilian Navy was placed under the operational control of the
U. S. Navy. It provided safe escort for hundreds of cargo ships. This interaction
established naval and air bases, radio stations, and training facilities all along the
Brazilian coast. Additionally, the Brazilian Navy received escort ships,
ammunition, spare parts, technical assistance, and training from the U. S. Navy.
This integration led to a modernization of the Brazilian Navy at all levels and
dependence on the U. S. Navy increased. IFerreira, 1983, p. 1 1
J
At the end of World War II, Brazil remained an underdeveloped country.
Agriculture still formed the economic base and industry was just beginning to
develop. Beginning in 1956, the Brazilian government initiated several measures
to improve the country's industry. Energy, transportation, industrialization and
education received increased emphasis. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 16]
Brazil's geographic location and the fact that most of its foreign trade was and
still is transported by sea, persuaded the government to find an alternative to
buying ships abroad. The decision was made to build merchant ships in the country
and in the last 20 years, Brazil has become one of the world's leading merchant
shipbuilders. Many private shipyards were established or expanded, financed by
both foreign and domestic capital, and used imported or indigenously-developed
technology. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 18-19]
After World War II, the Brazilian Armed Forces copied the thinking,
organization, material, training, and readiness of the U. S. Armed Forces. Ships,
weapons, tactics, and strategic concepts were derived from the United States Navy




Brazilian leaders, including the military, began to find that excessive
dependence on U. S. policies and strategic thinking could be inconvenient when
pursuing Brazil's objectives. One particular area of discord was military sales and
security assistance. The armed forces found increasing difficulties in attempting to
replace their U. S. equipment with more modern versions and were finally forced
to take their orders to the European market. This action opened new alternatives
and offered less restrictions than U. S. military sales agreements. [Ferreira, 1983,
p. 24]
D. THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN GOVERNMENT
The Brazilian Navy has not been the most influential military branch in the
country. Instead, the Army, because of its size, deployment, and historical
importance, has been the senior service. Especially in larger political issues, the
Army has prevailed over the Navy and Air Force. This influence is most
pronounced when it is noted that the President of Brazil from the coup in 1964 until
1985 has been an Army general. [Nyrop, ed., 1983, pp. 249, 310J
The dominance of the Army and the relative lack of influence of the Navy
became more pronounced after the revolt on March 31, 1964. This revolt was
instigated by a navy-related incident which polarized the military into two factions,
one supporting the regime in power, the other calling for major changes in military
and other policies. When President Goulart refused to support the senior military
officers' position, the Army moved to seize the government. [Nyrop, ed., 1983,
p. 66-67]
The Army's preeminence can also be traced to the importance placed on Rio de
Janeiro. This city has been the traditional center of the entire country, in
economics, politics, and culture. Thus the service that guards it, the Army, has had
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the best troops and the most modern equipment. Additionally, the commander of
the Army division in Rio has wielded enormous power. [Nyrop, ed., 1983,
p. 310-3111
The dominance enjoyed by the Army and the secondary role of the Navy
evolved because the major threats to Brazil have not been from the sea, but have
come from her continental neighbors in the south. The armies guarding the
southern regions, considered strategically important by Brazil, and the scene of
many hard-fought wars in the past, have had priority in manning and equipment.
[Nyrop, ed., 1983, p. 311
J
E. U. S. NAVY POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA AND
KRAZIL--1818 TO 1950
The U. S. Navy has had missions involving Latin America since 1818. Even at
that early date these missions were expressed in terms familiar today, protecting
U. S. national security interests. Though the methods for carrying out these
missions may have changed, the missions themselves are still seen as vital to U. S.
interests. [Gray, 1982, p. 3]
With government attention concentrating on the INF Treaty and its possible
effects on NATO, it is easy to downplay the strategic importance of Latin America.
However, in certain NATO wargame scenarios, Latin America becomes important,
particularly if access to the North Atlantic is denied the U. S. and its allies. In this
case, the southern sea lines of communication would be vital to allow continued
shipments of resources between continents. [Gray, 1982, p. 2]
The U. S. also has a long history of intervention in Latin America. In 1906
Brazil placed an order with Great Britain for two dreadnaughts. When Argentina
became concerned and began to also build up its military, President Roosevelt
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appealed tnjjrn7ji^insucce^f'ullv. to ^u^buyirig naval arms. The Tail ^
administration took a different approach, actually encouraging the American
shipyards to enter into competition with the European shipyards and bid for Latin
American contracts. Secretary of State Knox established the Bureau of Latin
American Affairs at the State Department and convinced Congress to appropriate
the funds to encourage U. S. firms to develop export trade. This policy resulted in
two ships being built for Argentina by the Ford River Shipyard in Quincy,
Massachusetts, between 1910 and 1914. [Gray. 1982, p. 41]
The first U. S. Naval Attache in Latin America was posted to Brazil in 1910,
the U. S. Commission to Brazil was established in 1918. The purpose of the
Commission was to build up and increase the efficiency of the naval strength of
Brazil as well as to educate and train naval personnel, encourage the use of
standardized materials, and foster friendly relations. At this time however, there
were no provisions made for transferring arms. [Gray, 1982, p. 53-60J
The U. S. Naval Mission became most influential in Brazilian naval
development between World War I and World War II. The senior Brazilian Naval
officers were convinced the U. S. Navy was second to none and began to look
routinely to the U. S. Navy for help. In 1921 the Brazilian battleships the Sao
Paulo and Minas Gerais were modernized in the U. S. at a cost to the Brazilian
government of $10 million. Additionally the weapons batteries were calibrated,
and under U. S. naval supervision the battleships conducted modern target practice
for the first time. Brazilian officers of the two battleships took orientation cruises
on American battleships and were sent to U. S. Navy service schools for training.
U. S. naval publications were translated into Portuguese, Brazilian naval aviators
13

were trained in the America, and new aviation equipment was purchased. (Gray,
1982, pp. 123-124]
By 1928, the U. S. Mission had made major changes to the Brazilian Navy.
The Mission had assisted in the development of an industri al capacity which al lowed
the Brazilian Navy to build destroyers of U. S. design. This assistance in building
destroyers is the earliest example of naval technical transfer and coproduction
between the American Navy and Brazil. Tactical instructions applicable to the
needs of the Brazilian Navy were prepared in Portuguese, and various other
technical publications were translated and published as well. American technical
assistance was provided in nearly every naval activity, including advice on the
construction of a large drydock. Finally, the Brazilian Naval War College was
reorganized along the lines of the U. S. Naval War College. [Gray, 1982, pp. 132-
136]
In 1934, the Nye Commission reported that the U. S. Naval Mission in Brazil
provided business for the U. S. munitions industries, increased the potential for
conflict in Latin America, and did not advance the cause of peace. This
investigation was prompted by the disagreement in the American government on
how U. S. naval power should be used in South America. By 1936, however,
attitudes had changed. The State Department declared that it would be preferable if
'other' governments in the Western Hemisphere, meaning Brazil, would get
military assistance from the U. S. rather than someone else. The increasing
influence of Germany, Italy and Japan was seen as threatening to American
interests, but the U. S. military was unable to convince the politicians of the




In 1937, the Lend-Lease Bill authorized the American Secretaries of War and
Navy to assist governments of Latin American republics to increase their military
and naval establishments. The bill allowed U. S. naval yards and arsenals to
contract for production of ships and weapons, standardize equipment, and sell arms
to South American countries for the same prices that they were sold to the U. S.
military. [Gray, 1982, p. 171]
There were protests to this bill. Many felt it would make an "arms huckster"
out of Uncle Sam. There was also concern that this action would arm the Latin
American countries against each other. With the advent of World War II, the bill
was finally passed in 1940, but it was too late to allocate any U. S. resources to
Latin America by this time. [Gray, 1982, pp. 172-173]
United States concern for preventing territories in the Americas from falling
under European domination began to mount as war approached in Europe. At the
Havana Conference in 1940, the Doctrine of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation
was signed. It contained the following guidance:
The U. S. would assist with armed forces if Latin America was attacked or
requested such assistance.
• The U. S. would provide arms, equipment, training and advisors by
providing stores directly or making the manufacturing capability in
government plants available.
The amount and type of aid would be situation-dependent. [Gray, 1982,
pp. 174-175]
As a result of the Lend-Lease Act, the Brazilian Navy received 8 patrol craft, 8
^submarine chasers, 8 destroyers, and miscellaneous other small boats, and aircraft.
[Gray, 1982, p. 225-226]
World Wars I and II convinced America of the following realities:
• The South Atlantic was strategically important.
15

There was danger of enemy penetration in areas of instability close to the
U. S. such as Latin America, and
There was a need for an efficient naval presence in the South Atlantic [Gray,
1982, pp. 106-107, pp. 250-251J
F. SUMMARY
Practically from the beginning Brazil relied on other countries for naval
personnel, training, and equipment. The long frustrating dependence on other
navies became a habit, too often leaving Brazil at the mercy of erratic political
winds.
The Army still dominates the service branches. Even the Argentine naval
failure in the Falklands/Malvinas War has apparently not helped the Brazilian Navy
modernize as they had hoped.
The 170 years of close association between the U. S. and Brazilian navies
greatly influenced and aided Brazilian Naval development. When this support
fluctuated due to changing political climates. Brazil's choices became limited:
either remain the lesser partner of the United States, content with the fate of the
Brazilian military in American hands, or strike out independently and strive for
self-determination. Brazil took the only path truly available.
16

III. THE BRAZILIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
Brazil's industrialization began in the 1930s and gained momentum alter a
period of slowed growth during WWII. The decade immediately after the war was
an era of economic prosperity. [Pereira, 1984, pp. 20-22]
The military-industrial complex developed through careful design. With
creative planning and perceptive foresight, the Brazilian government instituted
policies that steered the fledgling arms industry toward improved manufacturing
capabilities and receptive markets.
B. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRAZILIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY
AND RELATED GOVERNMENT POLICIES
The growth of defense production in developing countries is obviously
not a historical accident. Nor is it the product of national whimsy. It is, in
short, a consequence of perceived national needs... The reality is that Third
World decision-makers perceive an indigenous arms industry as providing at
least a partial answer for meeting their national needs. IMoodie, 1979a.
pp. 23-24]
In the early 1930s, the Brazilian government became closely involved in the
process of industrialization. The world-wide depression had caused exports to
decline and this caused the decline of foreign exchange resources. To protect local
products from foreign competitors the government imposed tariffs, quotas, and
exchange controls to make foreign goods very expensive. This allowed indigenous
entrepreneurs to produce or increase production of good previously imported.
Industrial production increased as a result. [Gwynne, 1986, p. 23]
17

The take-over of the Brazilian government by the military in 1964 allowed the
new regime to emphasize its own priorities lor the country. Economic growth
through encouragement of foreign investors was accentuated. Convinced that
Brazil was going to become a great and influential power that would need a better
equipped armed force, the new authorities encouraged the development of the arms
industry. By 1968, the country had entered what would later be termed the
"economic miracle" and industrial modernization was in full swing. {Nyrop, ed.,
1983, pp. 303-304]
By 1965 as Table 1 shows, a number of successful multinational corporations
were established in Brazil. These industries provided the base for the modern arms
industry, moving swiftly into the expanding and potentially profitable markets.
There were at least four automobile industries operating in 1965 and seven
other companies which were probably indirectly involved in the manufacture of
cars. Indeed in 1979, 25% of Brazil's exports were cars. By contrast, cargo ships
and tankers composed 3.9% of Brazil's total exports. [World Bank, 1983,
pp. 238-239]
The development of the arms industry was based on the collaboration of these
transportation and machine industries, with initial products being wheeled vehicles
for military use. Volkswagen automotive production technology was adapted to
manufacture armored personnel carriers, military trucks, and light tanks. In the
1970s, Rolls-Royce do Brasil Limitada made the turboprop and turbojet engines
for Brazil's new aircraft industry. {Evans, 1986, p. 105]

TABLE 1.
SELECTED FOREIGN FIRMS WITH MANUFA
FACILITIES IN BRAZIL -1965 [BUSINESS INTI
CORPORATION, 1965, P. 50]
CTURING
:rnational
Armco Steel Corp. United States
The Bendix Corp. United States
Borg-Warner Corp. United States
Caterpillar Tractor Co. United States
Combustion Engineering Inc. United States
The Electric Storage Battery Co. United States
FMC Machinery Int'l United States
Ford Motor Co. United States
General Dynamics Corp. United States
General Electric Co. United States
General Motors Corp. United States
General Telephone and Electronics Corp. United States
Honeywell Inc. United States
B. F. Goodrich Co. United States
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. Japan
Kaiser Industries Corp. United States
Radio Corporation of America United States
The Singer Company United States
Standard Oil Company of California United States
Timken Roler Bearing Co. United States
U. S. Steel Corp. United States
Vickers, Inc. United States
Volkswagen A. G. Germany
Westinghouse Electric Corp. United States
Brazil has given the most explicit attention to the role of technology in
economic development and to the stimulation of technological development
through government policy. Before 1968, most of the effort on the creation
of a technological infrastructure focused on institution building and human
resource development. Beginning in 1968, scientific and technological
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development became a specific policy objective, articulated mainly by the
National System of Scientific and Technological Development t'SNDC) and
the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDT).
The latter soon became the principal instrument for the implementation of
science and technology policy. (World Bank, 1983, p. xiiij
Subsidized financing was used to encourage technological development. From
1964-1974, priority funding was dedicated to postgraduate training for scientists
and engineers. After 1974, funding also targeted methods to increase firms
technological activities. [World Bank, 1983, p. xivj
After 1971, the government also concentrated on improving technology
transfer. First it evaluated whether the technology should be imported. It sought
to reduce the cost of the imported technology by strengthening the bargaining
position of the local licensee and eliminating clauses restricting the local absorption
and dissemination of the imported technology. It attempted to avoid limits in the
export of products manufactured with the technology and favored the importation
of technology rather than capital or goods. The technology transfer was concluded
only if the recipient Brazilian companies could absorb and use the technology.
Brazil demanded full disclosure of technical knowledge by the proprietors of the
technology and required the recipient companies to present plans for the absorption
of the technology and for local personnel training. [World Bank, 1983, pp. 99-1001
The government divided technology transfer agreements into five categories;
1) patent license agreements (title to industrial property, knowhow and technical
assistance; 2) trademark license agreements (right to use trademarks that involve
title to industrial property); 3) industrial technology license agreements (transfer
of knowhow to manufacture consumer goods); 4) technological and industrial
cooperation agreements (transfer of knowhow for manufacturing industrial plants,
machinery, and equipment); and 5) technical service agreements (planning,
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programming, and performing studies, projects, and specialized services). (World
Bank, 1983, p. 100J
In 1975 the government-owned company Industria Material de Belico
(IMBEL) was established. It reorganized the military industries to give them the
dynamism of private industry and better coordination with the civilian industries.
IMBEL also tackled areas too difficult for the private sector such as precision
instruments. IMBEL preferred the installation of foreign factories in the country,
and demanded the foreign companies find their own export markets and transfer
the technology of the products they manufactured to Brazil. (Moodie, 1979a, p. 48]
Brazil's policy toward foreign investment has been one of the most open among
developing countries. Brazil has relied on foreign investment as source of
technology and a source of capital to carry out large investment programs and
national development plans. The most common type of contract which Brazil
entered into with foreign firms was technical assistance, followed by engineering
services, trademark licenses, licenses for fabrication, and project preparation.
[World Bank, 1983, p. 98-99]
In the high technology sectors, foreign capital is acceptable only if there is
effective exchange of technology. The Brazilian agency in charge of technology
transfer is the national Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). It regulates transfer
of technology, establishes rules and policies for using patents, and decides whether
the technology is useful to Brazil. Most technology transferred originates in the U.
S., Japan, and the Netherlands. [IL&T, Brazil, 1987, pp. 3, 13]
Brazil has since maintained as protected a market as possible while stimulating
industrial exports through tax rebates. In 1981 for example, this rebate was a 15%
subsidy on export sales. [Gwynne, 1986, pp. 28-29]
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Brazil sees many advantages to being less dependent on the United States,
particularly in its arms industry. Besides minimizing dependence on America and
other arms suppliers, Brazil desires to reduce military and political vulnerability in
times of crisis. Attempts by trading partners to control or limit technology or arms
transfer have been traditionally perceived as interference in Brazilian national
sovereignty. Additionally, the economic incentives of increasing exports have
become more attractive as the debt of the country continued to grow. [Moodie,
1979a, pp. 25-31]
According to Moodie [1979a, pp. 38-41], a country's defense needs are
influenced by its military environment, the strategy and tactics it employs, and the
technology available. Thus Brazil sought to meet its defense needs as well as its
needs for continued industrial development by producing systems indigenously
which would meet its military requirements, use and improve its existing
technologies, and provide greater influence, economic advantages, and political
independence.
However, the argument is also made, not the least by the Brazilian Armed
Forces, that the quality of Brazil's arsenals and Brazil's future competitiveness in
the arms market depend on access to American high technology. [SIPRI Yearbook,
1987, p. 199]
Brazil is better than most other Latin American countries at adapting and
improving technology to meet local circumstances. Brazil has a large number of
highly trained professional and technical people that produce an internal flow of
technological knowledge. The availability of these people makes adapting the
imported technology easier. As the Japanese model of industrialization has shown,
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modern industrial success is rooted in constantly adapting and improving imported
technology, first to local conditions and then lor export. [Gwynne, 1986, p. 43
J
Brazil's policies welcome new technological designs but vigorously promote
domestic adaptation and improvement. The government also insists that
multinationals export a substantial portion of their products, up to as much as two
third in some cases. In return, Brazil adamantly excludes imports of competitive
products from rival multinational companies. [Gwynne, 1986, p. 44]
The multinational firms have been instrumental in providing Brazil with
foreign exchange, domestic income, and increasing labor and management skills.
When combined with the other two partners in Brazil's industry, the state firms,
and the national private firms, the process of industrial expansion became even
more efficient. Research and development teams and investments, and the ability to
adapt local products to meet the requirements of importing countries, made the
export markets attractive to Brazil and encouraged additional adaptation and
refinement of products. [Gwynne, 1986, pp. 44-52]
The high technology used in arms manufacture is probably spilling over into
the civilian sector. Conversely, because of the great profits to be made and the
government incentives offered, many foreign companies with plants in Brazil, such
as Singer, General Electric and Honeywell, are moving into arms production.
[Williams, 1984, p. 26]
C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ACQUISITION
Technology transfer has been an ongoing process for thousands of years.
Technology has been stolen by foreigners or carried out by migrants. It has been
passed from parent to child, teacher to student, master craftsman to apprentice.
With the advent of capitalism, technology itself became the object of commercial
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transaction. Today it is a commodity with peculiar properties. [Monkiewicz and
Maciejewicz, 1986, p. 1J
The strategic character of technology is not a recent revelation. The
Norsemen, invading Europe in the early 1800s, quickly realized that the French
made the best swords available and took great pleasure in using them to plunder
their makers. Charlemagne, King of France from 771 to 814, took steps to prohibit
the export of French-made swords to the Vikings, even imposing the death penalty
on anyone found breaking this law. [Brondsted, 1967, pp. 120-121] However it is
only recently that governments have realized how much technology transfer can
truly change the balance of power between nation-states.
Technology can be acquired in a great many ways. It can be stolen through
industrial espionage, passed through unclassified literature or trade shows,
expressed through scientific exchange programs, or passed from one person to
another through teaching or technical training. The export of technical data
includes not only actual shipment or transmission of data out of a country but
includes visual inspection by foreign nationals, and the application to situations
abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience learned in the U.S. [National
Academy of Sciences, 1987, p. 87]
The primary form of transfer this study will examine is the trade between
countries through active military exports and license applications, military sales,
and security assistance.
The concern surrounding transfer of technology arose in the early seventies.
The first official study, the Bucy Report, commissioned by the Department of
Defense in 1976, concluded that the primary emphasis in technology control should
be the control of "design and manufacturing knowhow." [Bucy Report, 1976,
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p. xiiij The study reported that the control of design and manufacturing
knowledge pertaining to military equipment or weapons is vital to the security of
the U. S. and its allies.
National security depends upon the technology intensive industries both
for sophisticated items essential to modern weapons superiority and for a
strong and flexible industrial capability for future contingencies. (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1983, p. iii]
According to Bucy, there are three areas that should receive primary emphasis
in control efforts. These are: design and manufacturing information that includes
instructions for design and manufacturing processes; keystone manufacturing,
inspection, or automatic test equipment; and products accompanied by sophisticated
operation, application, or maintenance information. [Bucy Report, 1976, p. 3]
In addition to defining the areas to be protected, the Bucy Report also
concluded that the manner in which information can be transmitted can effect the
efficiency witli which the information is absorbed and put to use by the receiver.
Transfer of vital design and manufacturing know-how takes place most effectively
with direct person-to-person interaction. [Bucy Report, 1976, p. 4
J
In 1982 a panel of the National Academy of Sciences examined the effect of
export controls on U. S. national security. Continued concern over the effects of
these controls caused a second panel to convene in 1984. The panel made several
recommendations, most of which are not directly related to this study. However,
several suggestions were made regarding agreements with Free World countries
that are not aligned with the United States or the Soviet Union:
• negotiate comprehensive understandings or informal arrangements that
specify controls on the exports of specified goods and technology.
• clearly separate national security and foreign policy export controls.
» and balance the protection of military security with the promotion of the
national economy. [National Academy of Sciences, 1987, pp. 169, 172-173]
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These three recommendations have vital importance as they pertain to making
the naval relationship between Brazil and the U. S. viable and operational.
I). STAGES IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Until recently, controlling military technology acquisition focused on transfers
from the West to the Soviet Union or its satellites. It was feared that the transferred
technology would allow the Soviets to vastly improve their military capabilities,
allowing them to threaten U. S. and allied security.
Apprehension is now also directed at technology transfers to countries that are
not alligned with the U. S., U. S. allies, or the U. S. S. R., countries that are willing
to trade with anyone regardless of ideological differences.
Before addressing this area, an understanding of the mechanisms of transfer of
technology will be helpful. The seven stages of knowledge acquisition which are
outlined below [Louscher and Salomone, 1987b, pp. 4-7J suggest the learning
process that takes place in the development of an indigenous arms industry.
Stage One is the acquisition of foreign manufactured items and foreign support
and maintenance services. Through grant or security assistance, the nation obtains
equipment from a country capable of manufacturing the items.
In Stage Two the receiving country becomes capable of maintaining the
equipment. Repair and rebuilding knowledge is transferred either through related
civilian facilities, or through training by the supplier. Often at this point, plants
and facilities are built.
Stage Three is licensed assembly. Local production capabilities are expanded
to include assembly under license. This production may take the form of
unassembled kits or component packages. This stage includes the gathering and
training of a major work force and labor specialization.
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Licensed assembly differs from licensed production, coproduction. and
indigenous production in several ways. First, the design of the item is still of
foreign origin. Second, all the parts and components are still obtained from the
foreign supplier. Finally, the design and construction knowledge and the
organization of the work force are usually supplied by the foreign licenser. The
critical transfer of production knowledge occurs at this stage.
By Stage Four the recipient nation has a capability to produce components and
provide final assembly of the item.
In Stage Five the recipient nation develops an engineering ability to modify or
copy the technology. This ability is then used to produce equipment that does not
require license or coproduction agreements.
The ability to indigenously design weapons systems marks Stage Six. Reliance
on foreign technology, training and parts is greatly diminished.
By Stage Seven a nation has achieved the ability to design and manufacture
systems completely within its own domestic industries.
Mow well a nation is capable of adapting and using foreign technology to build
up its own industries is dependent on a great many factors, not least among them the
ability to finance a huge volume of imports for a fairly long time. [Looney, 1987,
p. 164] As will be seen, Brazil has sustained a large but useful flow of naval
imports. However, Brazil has not been very successful in developing an indigenous
naval industry and has established only a small, regional export market for naval
products.
E. DEVELOPMENT OF A NAVAL INDUSTRY
Warships are by far the most expensive classical weapons systems that
exist. IFaltas, 1986, p. 39]
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Military equipment and weapons are expensive, and the cost continues to rise.
A major part of this expense is the increasing complexity of modern military
systems. The addition of the computer plus the complicated electronic integrating
systems may give advantages in capability to hardware, but may also quadruple the
cost. Some estimates calculate that the replacement cost of one warship doubles
every four years. [Faltas, 1986, p. 39]
According to Faltas 1 1986, pp. 54-55J there has been an internationalization of
the demand for modern warships. Prior to World War II, there wasn't really a
world market for navy ships. The few nations that had them were considered the
great powers, and almost exclusively built their own navies. But after the war, the
changes in alliances caused changes in naval missions and this implied changes in the
fleets themselves. The overall effect was that most of the navies, particularly in
Western Europe, became smaller. On the other hand, with their own markets
declining, and with many Third World countries becoming more affluent and
showing desires to behave as and assume the trappings of great powers, the
opportunity arose for the European shipyards to sell their wares.
Of course not all naval vessels were available for sale. For example, nuclear
powered submarines and large surface ships were not very marketable. These
types of vessels were simply not available for transfer or were not a preferred
product, being much too expensive to purchase and maintain and not very useful.
But the other types of ships such as conventionally-powered submarines,
destroyers, frigates, patrol craft and a variety of auxiliary vessels were very
marketable and much more affordable. [Faltas, 1986, p. 61]
By the late 1970s, the number of countries importing warships and related
technology had increased fourfold. It is not surprising that the nations obtaining
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this technology were those without highly developed naval industries, including
Brazil. [Faltas, 1986, p. 75)
The emergence of the modern naval industries in Brazil no doubt began with
the ship-building industries already in place. Brazil, just prior to World War II,
began to modernize its navy by building three destroyers based on U. S. designs.
Brazil then negotiated several joint or coproduction agreements that provided
needed upgrades to the navy and added vital naval technology and training to the
industry. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 10]
Brazil's pursuit of naval skills and knowledge followed the acquision path
described by Faltas. [1986, pp. 84-93] Brazil began by signing a contract with a
foreign shipbuilder, agreeing to the first ship being built in the foreign yard. The
next ships would be assembled and constructed in Brazil with the training and
technical assistance provided by the contracting technicians.
There are other factors that have affected the acquisition of naval technology,
and these played an important role in the Brazilian navy. Brazil received the
largest portion of its naval ships from the U. S. These ships were from the World
War II era and were purchased by Brazil. Since these were American ships, it was
then necessary for Brazil to adopt American methods of operation. This led to a
diffusion of naval doctrines and tactical concepts from the United States Navy to the
Brazilian Navy as well as training and the technological expertise needed to
maintain the equipment. [Ferreira, 1983, p. 23]
The Brazilian Navy began to modernize and contract with other countries for
modern ships. The transfer of manufacturing technology became an important part
of the contract agreement, and this further infused technology into the industry.
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The Brazilians also became experienced and educated enough to design their
own ships or to change the designs of the imported ships and have now moved
closer to the goal of indigenous design and construction. [Faltas, 1986, pp. 87-93]
As active as Brazil's still young naval industry is, there remain several factors
which will continue to obstruct further development. First, there is still not much
demand for naval ships. As the economies of scale are extremely important in
determining the cost of a product, unless Brazil can cultivate a market for ships
outside her own navy, then the construction cost will remain relatively high.
Further, the type of ship and equipment Brazil may wish to build for its own
navy may be unsuitable for the most likely clients. For example, Brazil wishes to
build several more Niteroi Class frigates, however, her clients have primarily
purchased smaller patrol craft and marine patrol aircraft suitable for their naval
missions as listed in Table 2. Their requirements for frigates are extremely limited
and are not likely to change in the near future.
Finally, some of the weapon systems Brazil is interested in involve sensitive
technology that is unlikely to be released. [Faltas, 1986, pp. 133-135]
However, there is a growing market for equipment that can be used to upgrade
the systems already in place in a country. This method of modernization is less
expensive than buying new systems, and is expanding as noted by Louscher and
Salomone. [1987a, pp. 131-160]
As with any commercialization process, marketing organizations and
procedures must be established. To stimulate arms exports, countries and
companies have patronized military periodicals and industrial journals to increase




MAJOR IDENTIFIED NAVAL ARMS AGREEMENTS -BRAZIL
EXPORTS 1970-1985
[LOUSCHER AND SALOMONE, 1987b, P. 96-98]














EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 12
EMB- 1 1 1 N Maritime Patrol Aircraft 6
Anchova Class Fast Patrol Boat 10
EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 6
EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 1
EMB-1 1 IN Maritime Patrol Aircraft 3
EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 2
EMB-1 1 IN Maritime Patrol Aircraft 8
Roraima Class Patrol Craft 1
EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(unconfirmed)
EMB-1 11 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 5
EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 3
(unconfirmed)
EMB-1 1 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 8
(negotiating)
:iSIPRl 1986, p. 394
^SIPRI 1985, p. 397
CSIPRI 1987, p. 255
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and cultivated diplomatic support in all ranks of government. [Faltas, 1986, pp.
194-198] Brazil has also been adept at marketing, as illustrated by volume of sales
and the reputation of willingness to bargain.
Brazil has also been most successful in encouraging foreign investment. For
example, West Germany's M. T. U. Friedrichshafen, a company which supplies
diesel engines for conventional submarines and surface ships, set up a subsidiary in
Brazil in 1978 to provide marketing assistance to the parent company, perform
maintenance for the clients in the region, and to develop its own capability for
serving the national and regional markets. [Faltas, 1986, p. 272]
F. THE TREND IN NAVAL EXPORT AGREEMENTS
In Brazil, from 1964 to the present, the growing and continued emphasis on
technology acquisition in the place of completed weapons systems is very apparent.
As can be seen from Table 3. the naval production capability of Brazil depends on
technology and assistance acquired from other countries. Though Brazil placed
enormous emphasis on developing indigenous industries, it concentrated on
developing its aircraft and armored vehicle industries, and deferred development
of the naval industry. [Louschcr and Salomone, 1987a, p. 109]
Of ninety-eight military export agreements reported by Louscher and
Salomone [1987a, p. 118-1 19], only seven are navy related. Of those seven, none
are totally indigenous. By contrast, of the remaining two industries, aircraft and
armored vehicles, 18 of the exports agreements or 19.8% are made entirely in
'Brazil. These numbers are additional indicators that the naval industry is not a




LICENSED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR NAVAL WEAPONS-BRAZIL
[LOUSCHER AND SALOMONE, 1987b, P. 92]
Country Weapon Name Lie. Year Prod. Year
United Kingdom Niteroi Class Frigate 1972 1972-75
Francea HB-350M Esquilo Helicopters 1977 1981-87
Italyb Sauro Class Submarine 1980 Uneon finned
Wadi Class Corvette 1980 Unconfirmed
France*5 Agreement signed by the French and Brazilian
calling for the transfer of French shipbuilding
Brazilian shipyards. (Exact date not noted.)
Defense Ministers
technology to
FR Gerni;my Type 209 Submarine 1982 1985
aSIPRI 1986, p. 413
bSIPRI 1983, pp. 309, 345, 489
Brazil's Army and Air Force exports began to have a large impact on regional
military relationships and power structures and on the world's market. The fact
that Brazil now successfully exports these products indicates that they are
acceptable in both quality arid quantity, that Brazil can produce them at a reasonable
price, and that other nations have found these products preferable and worth
purchasing. [Louscher and Salomone, 1987a, p. 113]
But what are some of the factors that accelerated the development of the army
and air force equipment and caused the navy to lag behind? First, there is the
perceived lack of a market for naval equipment. During the early 1960s, a group
of the arms industries conducted a market feasibility study for their weapons
products in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Using
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the findings, the Brazilian firms targeted their production at exports of simple,
cheap, and reliable systems-transport planes, the armored personnel carrier and
tanks— for use primarily in the Persian Gulf and Latin America. [Evans, 1986,
p. 105 1 Industry planners emphasized the use of the country's resources for
foreign exchange to service Brazil's debts. Most of Brazil's clients are land-locked
and are involved in conflicts in which naval equipment is not needed. In 1965 the
areas of major conflict were primarily the same as they are today, with the conflicts
concentrated in desert and mountainous terrain. There was no market in 1965 for
naval ships or equipment, and the market has not grown measurably since then.
The few naval exports that Brazil has reflect the same need for coastal boats, river
patrol boats or maritime patrol aircraft that Brazil itself finds useful. The
countries that import Brazilian patrol craft or maritime patrol aircraft do not show
an inclination to develop large navy. In fact, as Table 4 illustrates, the amount of
indigenous naval construction has declined.
Second, the industries already in place were more adaptable to personnel
carriers than warships. As previously indicated, the auto industry was firmly
established in Brazil with manufacturing, resources, and skilled labor already in
place.
Finally, the technology for building naval ships is more complex than that used
in building the basic army equipment. Though Brazil excels at building merchant
ships, it has not mastered the diverse and complex technologies that comprise
electronic equipment used in modern warships. Table 5 shows that most of the
weapons systems that are placed on the Brazilian ships are purchased from abroad,
indicating that Brazil is still struggling to absorb many technologies. Besides being
more complex, this type of naval technology is more expensive. A modern tank
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may cost $1.8 million, a fighter aircraft $18 million, but a frigate may cost $180
million or more. [Ferreira 1983. p. 32-39] Resources are still scarce and the
investment is probably not there because there would be no return.
National planning directed that arms producers not overlap in production and
thus not compete with each other for markets. |Nyrop. ed., 1983, p. 306) This fact
becomes more interesting when the statistics for the licensed production of weapons
systems is examined. Of 23 production agreements listed by Louscher and
Salomone [1987b, p. 92], only two are navy related. The remaining 21 agreements
deal with army and air force systems. Since the military must purchase the
majority of the electronic systems from other countries, this implies that the
industries have not developed the capabilities for producing complex electronic
TABLE 4.
PERCENT OF BRAZILIAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION 1965-1985
[PANDOLFE, 1987, PP. 339, 383, 426]
Indigenous United States Other Naval
Brazilian Naval Con- Construction for
Naval struction of Brazil (including





BRAZIL-MAJOR IDENTIFIED NAVAL ARMS AC'REEMENTS/IMPORTS
1970-1985
[LOUSCIIER AND SALOMONE, 1987b, PP. 88-89]
Supplier DATE ORDERED Weapons Name/Description QTY
Australia 1972 lkara-3 ShShM 144
1972 Ikara ShSuM 26
a 1983 A-4G SkvHawk Fichter-Bomber (for Navy ) 12
France 1970 MM-38 Exocet ShShM 24
1972 Otomat ShShM Unk
1972 MM-38 Exocet SSM 20
1982 MM-40 Exocet ShShM/SShM 48
1983 Exocet SSM 12
hi 984 MM-40L ShShM Launcher 8
a
1 984 MM-40 Exocet ShShM/SShM 48
b 1984 MM-40 Exocet 24
b 1985 AM-39 Exocet 24
b 1985 AS-350 Ecureuil Helicopter 11
b 1985 AS-332 Helicopter 6
FR Germany 1983 Aratu Class Sweep 2
1982 Type 209 Sub 2
Italy 1980 Wasi Class Corvette 12
1980 Maestrale Class Frigate Unk
1980 Sauro Class Sub 9
a 1982 SH-3D Sea King Helicopter 6
UK 1969 Oberon Class Sub 2
1970 Vosper Mk2 Niteroi Class Frigate 2
1972 Seacat ShShM/ShAM 104
1974 Sea King ASW Helo 3
1975 WG-13LLynxASWHelo 9
1975 Sea Skua AShM Unk
1977 Wasp ASW Helo 3
1979 Wasp ASW Helo 4
1981 Wasp ASW Helo 1
1982 Tigerfish Mk24 Torpedo 60
b 1985 Sea Skua AShM 32
US 1973 Allen M Sumner Class Destroyer 1
1974 Guppy II Type Sub 1
1974 Torpedo Boat 8
1983 LVTP-7A1 Amphibious Assault Craft 16
b 1985 Model 206B Helicopter 16
c 1985 LVTP-7A1 Amphibious Assault Craft 12
VSII'KI 1985. p. 391
b SII'RI 1987. pp. 24(M1
CSIPR1 1986, p. 375
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components that could be used to make systems for any of the service branches. If
the navy had been the primary recipient of systems purchased outside the country,
then the assumption could have been made that the other branches had developed
the technology but were not using it to arm the navy. The lack of capability in all
areas also accounts for Brazil's interest in protecting and developing its computer
industry and developing the capability to produce the electronic systems.
G. SUMMARY
In Chapter II the concern with technology transfer is examined, and the stages a
company, or on a grander scale, a country, goes through when absorbing
technology were outlined. The overview of Brazil's government policies
illustrated how they complemented and encouraged the expansion of the arms
industry. The stress on licensing, coproduction and technology transfer and
acquisition, and the use of multinational industries already in place, fostered a
climate that, in the short span of 23 years, took Brazil from an underdeveloped
country, to a newly industrializing nation, feverishly competing in international
arms trade.
The decline of indigenous naval production may be due to any number of
reasons. Perhaps the small buyers market, which is mostly regional, is saturated.
The recipient countries do not have a need for large amounts of such equipment.
Or maybe the resources which would be normally used to produce the naval
equipment are being used elsewhere, in the merchant ship industry. The army or
air force industries may have diverted the materials for their own use. Finally, the
small amount of coastal ships that even Brazil needs may have made production too
expensive for the time being. It would be more economical to wait for additional
orders, combine them, and then produce the required systems.
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However, a marked difference is obvious when comparing the Navy, Army
and Air Force industries. The army and air force equipment tend to have higher
priority in the Third World. [Faltas, 1986, p. 2871 This prioritization holds true in
Brazil. With the markets directing the merchandise, the technology being
complicated, and the successful arms exports influencing the pattern of national




IV. THE U.S./BRAZIL RELATIONSHIP
A. INTRODUCTION
The United States lias traditionally transferred arms that met valid military
requirements and garnered political influence and leverage for the United States.
Criteria normally used to assess the validity of the military requests have generally
been the responsibility of the Defense Department. The State Department
recommends actions forwarding U. S. interests. [Ronfeldt and Sereseres, 1979,
p. 169]
It is increasingly difficult for America to define valid military requirements,
particularly when dealing with nations that are determined to emphasize their own
perceived needs. When dealing with two or more countries, complications can
arise. If the U. S. desires to maintain close relations with all parties, the options can
be limited and can adversely influence relations. If military equipment being
requested does not appear justifiable in terms of both the threat and the local
capabilities for absorption or operations, the U. S. may simply not respond to the
request. [Ronfeldt and Sereseres, 1979, pp. 169-170] Now, the U. S. must look
beyond its own perceptions of "valid" To retain political influence with Brazil,
America must now accept Brazil's priorities and desires for a more equal naval
partnership. This partnership should include naval technology and security
assistance.
The U. S. Government has tended to expect arms transfers to return
benefits in the form of political influence and leverage. Indeed, arms
transfers are an important element within the web of relations, and may serve
to create dependencies and interdependencies. Certainly arms transfer
programs can contribute to a climate of political goodwill and can provide
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access to influential military and political elites. In addition, during a moment
of crisis the dependence on U. S. logistics and resupply may be manipulated
lor short-term gains... [Ronleldt and Sereseres, 1979, p. 172]
Beginning in the early 1960s, America noticed that many developing countries
were progressing toward assuming a greater financial share of their defense.
Additionally, profits from arms sales contributed positively to the U. S. balance-of-
payments and the arms industry. Thus arms sales were given more emphasis and
arms assistance was advocated less. [Warnke and Luck, 1979, p. 195]
B. ARMS TRANSFER PROCEDURES
Arms Transfer procedures are governed by the 1976 Arms Export Control
Act. When the U. S. transfers technology it considers critical to a recipient
country, that country must get permission from the U. S. before it can transfer the
technology to a third party. Brazil has preferred to avoid such restrictions and
tried to limits its requests to components not under such strict control.
In 1976 The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
expanded Congress's oversight by requiring all non-NATO military sales of $25
million or more be handled through government-to-governmenl (FMS) sales
rather than commercial channels. These sales became subject to congressional
veto. The act also required the President to submit to Congress a yearly country-
by-country justification, including an arms control impact statement. The third
change made by the act expanded the reporting procedures on both commercial
and government military exports, requiring information on agents fees and
political contributions. [Warnke and Luck, 1979, pp. 215-2161
The formal decision-making process for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is
initiated when a foreign government makes a request through either diplomatic or
military channels. The request is referred to the Bureau of Politico-Military
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Affairs and the regional bureau in the State Department. The Naval Office of
Technology Transfer and Security Assistance reviews navy-related requests and
consults with other agencies as appropriate. Routine sales are handled at lower
levels. Major decisions involving policy are made at higher levels, sometimes
requiring Presidential decisions. Upon executive branch approval, a Letter of
Offer outlining the terms is prepared. If the sales exceed $25 million the sale must
be approved by Congress. It is then presented to the foreign government. If the
offer is accepted the appropriate branch of the service carries out the terms of the
offer. [Warnke and Luck, 1979, pp. 216-217]
Commercial sales may be initiated through promotional efforts of private arms
manufacturers. These sales undergo a similar review process. Sales not subject to
congressional approval then proceed through private rather than Defense
Department channels. [Warnke and Luck, 1979, p. 217]
C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL PROGRAM
The Technology Transfer Control Program is the management
mechanism by which the Department of Defense (DOD) discharges its
responsibility for participation in the regulation of military-related exports of
goods, services, munitions, and technology under the Export Administration
Act of 19797 and the Arms Export Control Act. [Weinberger, 1984, p. 9]
This program was initiated in 1981 in response to congressional concern for
protection of America's key technologies and military systems. It gave the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy the responsibility for coordinating DOD policy on
technology transfer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering manages the overall technical efforts of DOD. Major areas of
concerted effort include:
• improving interagency and international cooperation,
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• engaging experts from industry and academia to assist in identifying militarily
critical technology,
• recommending export control procedures, and
• informing U. S. industry, academia and the public of the impact of technology
transfer on the East-West operational military balance. [Weinberger, 1984,
P- 91
Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2040.2, "International Transfer of
Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions" established the International
Technology Transfer Panel, and formed the Technology Security Center (effective
1984). The Transfer Panel assists DOD in resolving internal differences of opinion
over policy and technical recommendations on technology transfer. [Weinberger,
1984, p. 9J
This Directive states that the Department of Defense will treat defense related
technology as a valuable limited national security resource and sets forth the
following guidelines:
• to manage transfer in a way consistent with U. S. foreign policy and national
security objectives,
• control exports that would contribute to the military potential of a country
dangerous to U. S. security,
• limit transfer of advanced design and manufacturing knowhow to those
transfers supporting specific national security or foreign policy objectives,
• facilitate the sharing of military technology only with allies or other countries
that also safeguard that technology,
• give special attention to rapidly emerging and changing technologies to keep
them from the wrong hands,
• strengthen foreign procedures for protecting sensitive, defense-related
technology, and




I). U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
United States policy in the Western Hemisphere, as stated in the F :Y 88 Annual
Report to the Congress, is to deter strategic attack on North America, promote
democracy and freedom, foster economic development, and maintain the security
of the region. In Latin America, the U. S. has traditionally maintained a limited
military presence, and programs are planned according to the Rio Treaty and the
Charter of the Organization of American States. Economic and military assistance
have been the primary methods pursued in obtaining security objectives. Thus, the
strategy has been to increase foreign assistance, promote regional self-defense
capabilities, and actively participate in exercises and training as a show of support.
Recently, however, funding has been reduced in foreign assistance and defense
resources have been cut. [Weinberger, 1988, pp. 266-268]
The United States desires to protect fundamental national interests without
resorting to armed conflict. The Security Assistance Program defines these
interests as territorial integrity, political and personal freedoms, democratic
institutions, and economic prosperity. The U. S. government feels that U. S.
security and well being are best protected by the orderly conduct of relations
among nations, broad acceptance of democratic values, and a better quality of life
for all people. [Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs,
Vol. 1, 1987, p. 9J
To assure our own and the free world's security, and to avoid war, the United
States seeks first to deter aggression and-should this effort fail-to ensure that
we and other nations can mount an adequate defense to frustrate aggressive
designs. [Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Vol. 1,
1987, p. 9]
Immediate security objectives include:
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• improve relations with all nations, especially those in strategic areas of the
world,
• strengthen and develop defensive alliances and other cooperative military
arrangements,
• safeguard access abroad to support movement of U. S. forces to protect free
world interests.
• enable countries to defend themselves against external threat, maintain
internal order, strengthen democratic institutions and judicial systems, and
• alleviate the causes of economic and political disruption that threaten security
and independence. [Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance
Programs, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 9
J
The immediate threats as defined by the Security Assistance Program are:
• expansionist and destabilizing behavior of the Soviet Union,
• indigenous regional tensions,
• political violence, terrorism, and insurgency, and
• basic political, economic, and social problems, including poverty,
overpopulation, and corrupt governments. [Congressional Presentation for
Security Assistance Programs, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 9]
The United States Security Assistance Program is an important instrument for
pursuing peace and world order. It has been a cornerstone of postwar U. S.
foreign policy, and an integral part of our overall national security effort. In
order to maintain a stable world order, it is essential that threatened allied or
friendly countries are able to defend themselves. [Congressional Presentation for
Security Assistance Programs, Vol. 1, 1987, pp. 11-12]
Though America cannot provide all the equipment needed to secure a friendly
nation, nevertheless, security assistance is a vital and necessary element in helping
friendly nations build their own defense. Additionally, these programs play an
important role in the global defense posture of the U. S. [Congressional
Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 12]
The 1987 Security Assistance Program's policy goals towards Brazil are:
• promote key interests through FMS cash/commercial sales,
• enhance cooperative defense arrangements,
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• advance military industrial cooperation,
• promote regional stability, and
• safeguard democratic institutions. [Congressional Presentation for Security
Assistance Programs, Vol. 2, 1987, p. 149)
The Program's goal is to assist Brazilian forces in modernization efforts
through system upgrades, reinforce positive military participation in civilian
government, expand contact between U. S. and Brazilian military personnel, and
increase U. S. -Brazilian military compatibility in tactics, training, and doctrine.
[Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Vol.2, 1987,
p. 149]
Under the 1987 program, Brazil is expected to continue to procure defense
equipment and services, and professional and technical training through the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash and commercial procedures as in the past . As
Table 6 shows, Brazil has used the FMS program extensively. The International
Military and Education and Training Program (IMET), though modest at only
$100,000, will provide formal training in the U. S. for Brazilian Armed Forces
personnel in professional and technical courses. This training will improve
compatibility between the U. S. and Brazilian armed services but the absence of
even a modest security assistance program greatly hampers efforts to improve
cooperation. [Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs,
Vol. 1, pp. 6, 52, Vol. 2, p. 149, 1987)
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TABLE 6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA ON U.S.








1978 1980 1982 1984
YEARS
1986
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance
Facts, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) (Washington, DC: Data
Management Division, Comptroller, 1987), pp. 6-7, 16-17.
E. THE DECLINE OF UNITED STATES/BRAZIL RELATIONS
The U. S. Navy has enjoyed a long and mutually beneficial liaison with the
Brazilian Navy. From the time of the Spanish-American War the two navies have
cooperated actively with each other and gained experience and respect. The
establishment of the first U. S. Naval Mission in Brazil in 1922 heralded the
beginning of close navy-to-navy dealings to include the transfer of technology
from America to Brazil.
In 1942, as Brazil sided with the Allied Powers against the Axis, President of
Brazil, Geulio Vargas, in 1942, placed the Brazilian Air Force and Navy under
operational control of the U. S. Fourth Fleet. Their primary task was escorting the
cargo vessels carrying previous supplies and protecting them from the German
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U-boat threat. The joint efforts of the Brazilian and U. S. Navies resulted in the
sinking of eleven German subs and the capture or destruction of five Axis blockade
runners.
After World War II, the United States Navy gave Brazil 25 navy warships and
25 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft, virtually all of which are still in
service in the Brazilian armed forces today. Additionally the navy provided
essential naval training and there was significant senior officer interaction.
The rise of Brazilian nationalism in the early seventies combined with the
unsettled state of America, due to Vietnam and other internal concerns, altered the
U. S./Brazil government-to-government relationship. Though the militaries
maintained close and amicable relations, the U. S. and Brazil, as nation-states,
found themselves drifting apart. Trade, technology transfer, debt issues, liberation
theology and other subjects proved increasingly divisive. The focus of U. S.
foreign policy was aimed at the Far East, China, and the Soviet Union, leaving little
time for southern neighbors. America was perceived as being much too
patronizing toward Brazil. In turn, the United States ushered in a peculiar form of
'benign neglect' of its long-time friend.
Another challenge surfaced in Brazil in the early 1970s. Brazil realized it had
a massive energy problem that could not be resolved solely by building
hydroelectric power plants. Needing a reliable source of power to continue
industrialization and provide community services, the Brazilian government
turned to nuclear power as a viable option. In the early seventies, the U. S.
government offered technical assistance in the design and construction of the plants,
but later declined to sell fissionable fuel to Brazil. Brazil then turned to the West
Germans for reactor fuel. Shortly after his inauguration, President Carter sent
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Vice President Mondale to persuade the Germans not to sell the required material
to Brazil. This opposition by the U. S. government violated assurances made by
Henry Kissinger to the Brazilian government in 1 ()76. Kissinger had stated that the
U. S. would not conduct any negotiations that would impact on Brazil without
consulting the Brazilians first. Brazil's discovery of U. S. interference caused an
immediate chill in the two country's relations.
In 1977, the U. S. Congress further eroded the American/Brazilian
relationship by requesting Brazil submit to human rights reporting requirements.
Though Amnesty International had reported favorably on the Brazilian situation in
1976, the Brazilians considered the Carter Doctrine an intrusion into their internal
affairs and refused to comply with its provisions. The U. S. Ambassador to Brazil
was tasked to deliver a demarche to the Brazilians encouraging them to acquiesce to
the human rights reporting requirement. Both the timing and the tone of this
message were inappropriate and the Brazilians reacted rapidly and rashly to this
turn of events. The next day the Brazilian government renounced all military
agreements with the United States.
The abrogation of these agreements had some very negative effects. In August
of 1977, the Joint Brazilian United States Military Commission (JBUSMC) was
terminated and in December, 1977, the U. S. Naval Mission in Brazil was also
closed. In effect the Brazilian reuninciation of the 1952 and 1956 Military Accords
cut off the blanket access the U. S. had enjoyed to Brazilian airports and seaports.
Future use of these facilities would now require prior Brazilian approval.
This shift in the U. S.-Brazilian military relationship also affected military
training. Brazil began to send more of its officers to Europe for education.
Additionally other non-military areas were adversely affected. For example, the
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Brazilian version of the FBI had been attempting to obtain computerized finger-
printing technology. This transfer of equipment was also stopped due to human
rights sanctions.
To manage the security agreements that were already in progress and thus
allowed to continue, the U. S. government created the Security Assistance
Management Staff (SAMS). The Brazilian government was not wholly receptive
to the establishment of this organization since it was perceived as an extension of
JBUSMC and doubts existed as to the real purpose of SAMS. By 1980, the U. S.
was able to convince Brazil to allow SAMS to remain, with negotiations for
maintaining this presence coming up every two years.
SAMS, since renamed the Military Liaison Office (MLO), was and is still not
officially allowed direct contact with their Brazilian military counterparts. For
any request to be handled, the MLO must go through the Defense Attache Office
(DAO) which can then pass the information to the appropriate Brazilian military.
The procedure is also reversed. For the Brazilian military to make a request, it
must be made through the attache, then be passed to the MLO for action.
By early 1986, the Brazilian Army had considerably lessened their restrictions
and initiated some direct contact with the MLO. To a lesser degree the Brazilian
Air Force had followed suit. However, several incidents have tarnished the navy-
to-navy relationship. Thus while the Brazilian Army and Air Force have
circumvented rigid regulations concerning contact, the Navy still avoids informal
liaison. The Brazilian Navy thus sometimes makes requests to its attache in




The General Security of Military Information Agreement, GSOMIA, is the
bilateral government-to-government agreement which protects military
technology transferred from the United States to the signatory country. GSOMIA
receives its mandate from the 1976 Arms Export Control Act and requires that all
classified military information passed between two governments and subsequently
released to contractors must be protected in accordance with the following
principles:
• the recipient country must not release the information to a third party without
the approval of the releasing government,
• the recipient country will afford the same degree of protection to the military
information as the releasing government afforded it,
• the receiver will not use the information for purposes other than the reason it
was transferred,
• the receiver will respect all private rights such as patents and trade secrets of
the releasing country,
Presently more than forty countries, including the NATO allies have signed
security agreements. [GSOMIA, 1987, p. 1 j
Brazil, however, has chosen thus far not to sign a GSOMIA with the United
States. When first informed about the agreement, Brazil protested for several
reasons. First, Brazil thought that the NATO Allies had not signed and that Brazil
was being singled out in being required to sign the agreement before it could
receive sensitive military technology. Second, Brazil misinterpreted the second
requirement. Before the United States would allow any information to be released,
It would need to inspect the security control systems of the receiving country. The
Brazilian government interpreted this to mean that the U. S. would actually be
inspecting the contents of its classified material containers and investigating other
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secure areas. However, the U.S. only inspects the security methodology and even
invites the other nation to examine or evaluate U. S. security systems and classified
safeguards as illustrative of the requisite GSOMIA security standards.
According to a Navy spokesman, in 1985, Brazil was briefed on the GSOMIA.
The U. S. proposed that Brazil sign the agreement to facilitate technology transfer
requests that Brazil had made previously. However, Brazil was very reactive to
this suggestion, believing they were being treated differently than other U. S. allies
and so did not sign the agreement.
In February, 1986, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Fred Ikle
went to Brazil on a fact-finding trip. He had no set agenda but he did want to talk
about GSOMIA. He felt that if the Brazilian government understood the agreement
they would be willing to sign.
It was at this time that Secretary of Defense Weinberger decided to make an
exception for Brazil. Instead of requiring that the GSOMIA be a government-to-
government agreement, Secretary Weinberger offered Brazil the opportunity for
service-to-service agreements. This offer was quite exceptional. Service-to-
service agreements would require a separate agreement on a case by case basis. For
every piece of equipment or technology requested, a separate agreement would
have to be signed. Secretary Weinberger based his decision on Brazil's importance
as an ally and defense partner. Brazil, however, remained adamant against signing
a GSOMIA.
In July, 1986, Mr. Ambrose, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, made a trip
to Brazil. He was tasked with discussing GSOMIA with the government and
offered to send a team of experts to visit Brazil to discuss the agreement in detail.
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In October, 1986, at the Seventh Annual Joint U. S./Brazil Security
Consultations, GSOM1A was not on the agenda and therefore the U. S. did not
expect the Brazilians to raise the issue.. However, during a question and answer
period, Brazil asked the U. S. specifically to explain GSOMIA. The agreement
again became a topic lor discussion.
In November, 1986, the team of experts offered by Mr. Ambrose visited Brazil
and explained the agreement. The Brazilian government still declined to officially
sign, but the Brazilian Army, Navy and the Air Force independently expressed the
desire to conclude service-to-service, case-by-case agreements.
At the Bilateral Maritime Strategy Talks held June 27 to July 2, 1987, the
Brazilian Navy again requested information on GSOMIA. Realizing the need to
sign an agreement before desired naval technology could be transferred, a
Brazilian naval representative unofficially indicated a willingness to abide by the
terms specified in the agreement.
Several significant events have affected the United States' attempts to
encourage Brazil to ratify the GSOMIA.
The fust event occurred in the early 1980s. The Brazilian Air Force requested
information from the U. S. Air Force on rocket motors. This request was
originally denied. Later, the Brazilian Navy made a similar request from the U. S.
Navy. Because it had been previously denied, the request was reviewed by the
Defense Policy Review Committee (DPRC) and again denied. This Navy review
and this process took time. The Brazilian Navy was concerned that the delay in




The second significant event was a 1985 request from the Brazilian Navy for
inertia! navigations systems aboard submarines. The United States Navy reviewed
the request and approved it. It was then also reviewed and approved by the
Secretary of Defense. In 1986, before the systems could be delivered, the Brazilian
Navy sent in another request for two additional systems of greater accuracy The
United States Navy denied the second request because they felt that the Brazilian
submarine forces did not need the additional accuracy for navigation purposes and
secondly there was concern about potential use of the technology for other
applications. Though the U. S. Navy felt the Brazilians would not attempt to adapt
the technology for other uses, U. S. government concern for unauthorized
application decided the issue against transfer.
The third event was the November 1985 request from Brazil to lease or
purchase several of the Charles F. Adams class DDG ships, on the U. S. Navy's
active duty list at the time. Brazil's request was founded on the fact that their own
corvette ship-building programs were significantly behind and the operational
forces spent an inordinate amount of time in maintenance and upkeep of their
World War II vintage ships. Although the U. S. Navy was receptive to this request,
the need for a Congressional waiver to remove these ships from the active U. S.
inventory is a politically sensitive action unlikely to garner support from the
Secretary of the Navy in his pursuit of a 600-ship navy.
The latest request from the Brazilian Navy is directed at the possible
opportunity for future purchase of six of the Garcia class or the Brooke class
frigates, and one of the Thomaston class (LSD) ships. This petition, made in
March, 1988, recognizes the requirement that the U. S. Navy must take these ships
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out of active inventory before they can be offered up for possible sale. These
requirements are under consideration at present.
There is support for the sale of these naval assets to Brazil. In December 1986,
Admiral Trost directed that a South Atlantic Maritime Strategy be developed and
incorporated into the U. S. global maritime strategy with specific roles designed
for participating Latin American countries. He also directed that the countries
involved should not be subordinate to United States policy but should work in
support of each other, where and when appropriate, against a common threat. This
assertion directly supports the goals of the U. S. Security Assistance Program
mentioned earlier.
This initiative and the chance to supply these assets to Brazil provide the
foundation for increased cooperation. As previously outlined, the United States
and Brazil have had a long and mutually beneficial relationship. They have been
hemispheric defense partners in the past and should continue to be partners in the
future. Brazil is the primary political power in Latin America and as such can be
very influential. America, by already signing a Memo of Understanding in 1984,
has made an honest attempt to develop defense technology that is of mutual benefit
to both countries. Should Brazil agree to sign the GSOMIA, past trends of could be
reversed, and the navy-to-navy relationship could be considerably enhanced.
It is inescapable but to conclude that Brazil's government and its navy are
embarked upon a more independent (and nationalistic) foreign policy which
conceptualizes new strategic realities and priorities. It would be wrong to
perceive this inevitable decline in the relationship as inimical to western or U.
• S. interests. Instead, it would be far better to manage the diminution as best





This chapter has very briefly outlined arms transfer and security assistance
procedures. The technology transfer dilemma between Brazil and United States
Navy has yet to be resolved. Though the U. S. has offered to transfer certain naval
technologies, Brazil's reluctant to sign the GSOMIA and protect the technology has
prevented the resolution of any agreement.
Brazil's desire to purchase U. S. equipment indicates a preference for U. S.
equipment and technology. The protection of this naval technology, though
important, should not prevent the United States from supporting the Brazilian
Navy.
In this regard, efforts by the United States Navy to retain a strong allied
posture with the Brazilian Navy have an importance which transcends both
traditional service-to-service dealings and the defense dimension. Indeed, this
relationship might well be termed a fulcrum for foreign policy and shared
strategic interests in the South Atlantic for the governments of Brazil and the
United States. (McCune, 1985, p. 2]
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V. THE U.S. AND BRAZIL-FUTURE NAVAL PARTNERS
A. CONCLUSIONS
When undertaking this stud)', the conjecture was that Brazil lias a successful
naval industry and is actively exporting naval equipment. Additionally, United
States security assistance and military technology transfer was thought to be a
major contributor to the Brazilian naval industry. Preliminary research revealed
that the Brazilian naval industry is not as active an arms exporter as its counterparts
for several important reasons.
First, Brazil became dependent on foreign naval experience and equipment as
early as 1822. The decline of the navy in 1870 forced the Brazilian Navy to import
the majority of their naval hardware. For over 150 years, for a variety of reasons,
Brazil has counted on the foreign market to supply its warships, and provide
training and naval equipment. This dependence had been a burden. Brazil's
priorities have often been set aside at a political and industrial diminution of her
naval power.
This assistance has not only been from the United States. Recently, the
Brazilians have turned again to Europe for military assistance and naval
technology. Additionally, military officers have received education in European
schools and learned European strategy and tactics. Though improvement in the
capabilities of the naval industry has not occurred until very recently, the continued
and increasing influence of European technology may cause naval cooperation
between the U. S. and Brazil to further deteriorate. As the U. S. now seeks to
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include Brazil in (lie Maritime Strategy, renewed naval interaction would better
serve U. S. and Brazilian interests.
Brazil remains dependent on technology and training from other countries,
such as France, the Federal Republic of German)', and Italy. Brazil has also
purchased items from Australia, Canada and the Republic of Korea. [Louscher and
Salomone, 1987b, p. 89J
Vosper Thornycroft of England is still greatly influential in the Brazilian naval
industry. Using Thornycroft designs, Brazil began production of coastal patrol
craft in the 1970s. In 1972, Arsenal de Marinha began production of the Niteroi
Class training ships, again basing their work on designs by Thornycroft. The first
Brazilian designed frigate, completed in 1983, was constructed with advice from
the West German Marine Technik Design Company. The engines for these vessels
are of German or British origin and the missiles, guns, radar, and antisubmarine
weapons continue to be purchased abroad. (Louscher and Salomone, 1987b. p. 92]
Secondly, during the "economic miracle" in the late 1960s, the Brazilian
government stressed license agreements and technology transfer and acquisition
when dealing with the multinational corporations that wanted to invest in the
country. However, a market survey showed little opportunity for profit in naval
exports. The industrial emphasis was directed at army and aircraft equipment
which could be easily adapted to client requirements and which had a ready market
in the oil-rich Middle East. Entrenched Brazilian businesses provided
manufacturing and technical skills and proved adaptable for tank and aircraft
production. The naval industry was placed on hold.
Third, the army continued to direct the country's industrial goals and the navy
received less financial and industrial attention than the other service branches.
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Finally, the decline in European navies due to the changing world situation
coincided with the rise in Brazilian nationalism and desire to begin the drive toward
becoming a great and influential power. As a maritime nation. Brazil followed the
United Stales and Great Britain in understanding the need for a navy to project
power and protect national interests. While Brazil purchased equipment, training
and technology from abroad, attempts were made to strengthen indigenous naval
industries and break the historical bond of naval dependence.
Lack of investment, lack of self-developed naval technologies, and difficulties
in applying technological advances to navy industries still delay development.
Modernization is sporadic and programs are interrupted or discontinued. It is
difficult to convince a national or private shipyard to interrupt merchant ship
construction and rearrange the assembly line to satisfy small, sporadic navy orders.
[Ferreira, 1983, pp. 32-39]
Brazil's economies of scale affect production and concentration of naval assets
in Rio de Janeiro overloads logistics and impairs management. Warships are
expensive to produce. Developed maritime nations have large and busy shipyards
and can product ships more cheaply. [Ferreira, 1983, pp. 32-39]
In light of the emphasis on protection of offshore resources, the 200 nautical
mile exclusion zones, and perceived coastal patrol requirements, it is not suqirising
that the production of naval vessels is one of the most widespread endeavors of the
developing arms producers such as Brazil. The most commonly produced and
purchased naval system in Latin America is the coastal patrol boat, again reflecting
the security requirements of the area and the relatively simply technology involved.
[Moodie, 1979a, p. 18]
58

The rising international concern with arms trade and the possibility of political
pressure may dim Brazil's desire to become a great power. The practices of
"responsible pragmatism," and trading with anyone, are seen as irresponsible and
Brazil may have to rethink its premise that its arms trade has nothing to do with its
foreign power.
Some analysts believe that the division between industrialized and Third World
countries will continue between arms producers, and that there is a growing
stratification among Third World producers. However, increasing trade and
technology transfer between Third World suppliers and recipients is already
closing the division and leveling out the stratification. For example, technology
trade agreements between Brazil and China, and Brazil and Saudi Arabia promise
to transfer some very important and potentially destabilizing capabilities. The
U. S. will not be able to stop these transfers.
Additionally, the trade between Brazil, China, and Saudi Arabia indicate that
the quality of weapons may be improving. Up to now, the U. S. has kept ahead of
the pack by virtue of the quality and capabilities of American weapons. As the
second tier suppliers increase their trade, this edge may begin to erode. Such
actions may actually increase the technological edge of the suppliers and recipients
and narrow the gap between Third World countries and the industrialized world.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NAVAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY
The desire to include Brazil in the U. S. Maritime Strategy necessitates a review




First, Brazil should again become eligible for security assistance from the
United States. This eligibility could be as simple as ensuring the Brazilian Navy is
first in line to receive the opportunity to purchase or lease naval equipment. Brazil
has asked the U. S. for surface ships to replace the aging ships in the fleet and for
advanced naval weapons systems. Brazil needs to modernize. If Brazil is
incorporated into the Maritime Strategy, then she must have the capability and
training to do so as a full partner. This means transferring naval technology that
will allow Brazil to meet mission requirements. Potential missions could include
basing, sea lines of communication protection, surveillance, and antisubmarine
warfare, missions essential to any South Atlantic Maritime Strategy. Assisting the
Brazilian Navy with equipment, training, and joint exercises ensures compatibility
in operational and tactical areas. For the U. S. to expect Brazil to make do with less
would be unwise.
Naval technology transfer policies should be reviewed with the goal of
changing them to reflect the inclusion of Brazil into an American South Atlantic
Maritime Strategy. Once missions have been defined, the technology transferred
should complement these missions. Concern for the technology itself would be
relieved once Brazil signed the GSOMIA.
Naturally, Brazil should be encouraged to sign the GSOMIA before receiving
any technology. Brazil's agreement to sign would restore trust between the two
countries and invigorate the relationship. Her willingness to cooperate would
indicate a maturing toward foreign policy responsiveness and an awareness of her
importance to the United States.
Building up the Brazilian Navy through security assistance and naval
technology transfer will free up U. S. naval resources. The new budget constraints
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suggest such interaction between the Brazilian Navy and the U. S. Navy will
become even more important. The U. S. is stretching ever scarcer resources over
widening areas. Any augmentation from other nations should be most welcome.
Brazil continues to show support for the U. S. The Brazilian Navy
involvement in the UNITAS exercises this year (1988) reportedly include an
aircraft carrier and more ship participation than earlier exercises. This renewed
interest may lead to better integration of U. S. /Brazil naval capabilities. The
Bilateral Maritime Strategy Talks scheduled in September 1988 also illustrate
Brazilian interest in cooperating with the U. S. in maintaining freedom of the seas
in the South Atlantic.
The United States must look not only to its own interests, but must understand
the views of the Brazilian government and its plans for its naval improvement. The
U. S. is and should be concerned with continuing the excellent working relations
between the two navies that existed for years. In terms of protecting the South
Atlantic during a conflict with the Soviet Union, the Brazilian Navy's assistance
would be invaluable, as has been historically illustrated. But beyond the advantage
to the U. S., the Brazilians must be allowed sovereign control of their own destiny.
The lessons of the Falklands War are still fresh, and the Brazilian Navy wants a
force of fixed-wing carrier-borne aircraft. Since their own carrier is unsuitable
for this type of jet operation, the navy's choice will be to either purchase the
V/STOL Sea Harrier from the U. S., which could be operated from the Brazilian
carrier, or buy or build a replacement. (Ilowarth, 1985, p. 1426]
The U. S. can take advantage of this activity. Instead of retreating in the wake
of Brazilian protectionism, the U. S. and the U. S. Navy should strive to use
technology as a tool to gain increased influence. By assisting the Brazilian Navy,
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America can increase the compatibility between the two countries. Continuing the
educational programs, ship visits, and joint exercises can foster good relations and
improve understanding and the ability to work together.
The U. S. should be concerned with the growing reliance Brazil is showing on
the European naval establishment. By moving away from the American Navy,
Brazil may not only be changing her naval equipment, but may also be changing her
naval tactics, operations, and orientation as well. Europe has less of a strategic
interest in the southern Atlantic than the L\ S. or Brazil. For the U. S., retaining a
compatible and familiar association with Brazil should be a priority.
/ Brazil still feels that it needs access to the U. S. technology market to remain
competitive and to continue its industrial modernization. The U. S. could use this
desire to encourage increased trade and open new markets, in both the military and
the civilian sector.
Latin America is important to U. S. national security. World Wars 1 and II
taught this lesson. The growing concern over outside anti-American influence in
the region reinforces the lesson as the instability draws closer. America needs
Brazil as a friend, and Brazil needs America as an ally. Surely there is a common
ground on which the two countries can meet. The era of "benign neglect" must end.
The U. S. still has the chance to build a strong and enduring partnership with
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